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Our paper studies the causes of poverty from the perspective of job search. We show 
that poor people remain poor because they have less time and initial endowment to 
search for a better job. Initial endowment is key to successful job search, as one can 
afford not to work and search longer for a better job. Having an initial endowment, a 
worker is able to educate or re-qualify himself. Working long hours and obtaining low 
pay, poor people have little time to look for a better job. Low-paid, low-skilled jobs 
rarely allow on-the-job search like high-paid positions where with the help of contacts 
and a lot of idle time professionals seek better jobs. Quitting in order to find a better 
job increases the opportunity cost of search for poorer people. Since they do not have 
any accumulated income, they can only live off their salary. With less income and 
time, poorer people are less likely to get educated since education requires both 
wealth and free time. But being less educated, they are likely to remain poor as 
education is a promise for success in contemporary society. Thus, they remain in the 
vicious circle of poverty. In order to prove this hypothesis we investigate optimal 
search time for a better job as dependent on factors such as wage rate, individual’s 
income, education, and skills. 
 
 
1. Rationale and Literature Review 
 
Our paper was inspired by Barbara Ehrenreich’s book “Nickle and Dime: On (Not) 
Getting by in America” although we have previously been familiarized with Günter 
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Wallraff’s “Ganz Unten”2. Ehrenreich’s idea is that poor people create much greater 
value than what they are paid for, thus, letting others live off their generosity, opposite 
to the common belief. The famous journalist takes low-paid jobs in order to 
experience the hardships of poverty. She finds that ordinary low-wage workers are 
paid much less than they deserve and than the subsistence level, barely providing for 
themselves, let alone a family. Because one job is not enough, a worker has to take at 
least two in order to live indoors. Low-prestige, low-level occupations at the same 
time require a lot of mental and physical efforts. Ehrenreich writes: 
 
“When someone works for less pay than she can live on ... she has made a 
great sacrifice for you ... The "working poor" ... are in fact the major 
philanthropists of our society. They neglect their own children so that the 
children of others will be cared for; they live in substandard housing so that 
other homes will be shiny and perfect; they endure privation so that inflation 
will be low and stock prices high. To be a member of the working poor is to be 
an anonymous donor, a nameless benefactor, to everyone.”3 
 
Intrigued by Ehrenreich’s description of the poor layers of the American labor force 
with their struggle for survival and better life, we study how low pay and hard labor 
prevent workers from obtaining wealth and social status. More specifically, we show 
that, having less search time and initial endowment, poor people remain trapped in a 
low-level, low-paid position with no chance of escaping the whirlpool of poverty. 
Working long hours for low pay, poor people have little time to look for a better job. 
Low-paid, low-skilled jobs do not allow on-the-job search whereas with the help of 
professional contacts and available time people in high-paid positions seek better jobs. 
In their search for a better job people in low-paid, less prestigious jobs have to quit 
but quitting increases the opportunity cost of search for them. Since they do not have 
any accumulated income, they can only live on their salary. With less income and 
time, poor people remain less educated and poor. We study optimal search time for a 
better job as dependent on factors such as wage rate, individual’s income, education, 
and skills. More specifically, setting *t  to be optimal search time, we express the 
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comparative static effect of the number of years to search ,y  the minimum wage level 
,
o
w  the educational level 
o
e , etc., on the optimal search time. 
 
There is extensive economic literature dedicated to job search. Search theory 
generally is a branch of microeconomics that studies optimal decision-making of 
rational individuals with regard to potential opportunities of different quality, 
accounting for both the external and internal costs of search. External costs include 
those of acquiring information and the opportunity cost of search time. External costs 
are exogenously determined and the individual may choose only whether to incur 
them or not. Internal costs include the mental effort to undertake the search, sort the 
incoming information, and integrate it with what the consumer already knows. 
Internal costs are determined by the consumer's ability to undertake the search, which 
depends on intelligence, prior knowledge, education and training (Smith 1999).  
 
In labor economics, search theory is related to job-seeking models where a worker 
searches for a job that pays a high wage or offers desirable benefits, safe and desirable 
working conditions. The search process is related to the optimization problem of how 
much time and effort to spend searching, and which offers to accept or reject. In the 
1960s Stigler (1961) and Alchian and Allen (1964) were among the first economists 
to study the problem of search for employment in an economy where information is 
costly and uncertainty prevails. McCall (1970) put this economically important 
problem in a mathematical framework. His search model obtains an optimal search 
policy, where the worker knows the distribution of wages for his particular skills, the 
cost of search is a known constant, and the value of money is constant. Holding fixed 
job characteristics, the searcher makes a job search decision with respect to his 
reservation wage, i.e., the lowest wage he is willing to accept. Job offers arrive 
periodically and the searcher accepts or rejects them as they arise. The worker’s 
optimal strategy is simply to reject any wage offer lower than his reservation wage, 
and accept any wage offer higher than his reservation wage. The reservation wage 
may change over time if some of the conditions assumed are not met. For example, if 
the worker is risk averse, the reservation wage will decline over time if the worker 
gradually runs out of time and income while searching. The reservation wage will also 
differ for two jobs of different characteristics; that is, there will be compensating 
wage differentials between different types of jobs. 
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McCall’s basic model serves as a basis for later works among which those of 
Mortensen (1977), Burdett (1978), Pissarides (1994), Jovanovich (1984), and Van den 
Berg (1992). These authors analyze important issues connected to job search and the 
behavior of unemployment (Pissarides 1994), wage determination (Burdett 1978, 
Jovanovic (1984), Mortensen (1986)), job duration, job turnover (Van den Berg 
1992), quit rates (Burdett 1978), and unemployment insurance and employment 
protection (Pissarides 1994). These seminal economic models have given birth to 
extensive research in the context of search theories, and the empirical studies serve to 
investigate the stylized facts of the classical theory. Search theories have discussed 
optimal time search in the context of other issues – Kahn (1978) estimates the 
relationship between search time and resulting wage and further the duration span of 
unemployment is investigated. Yoon (1981) includes search time as endogenous 
factor determining unemployment duration and pays attention specifically to intensity 
of the search effort in determining search costs. Optimal search time is also discussed 
as the marginal benefit of not being employed or the value of unemployment benefits 
during the unemployment duration (Van den Berg, 1990).   
 
Our purpose is to study an individual's optimal strategy when searching for a job in 
light of the trade-off involved: the cost of remaining unemployed while searching 
versus the added value of the option to find a better job. We are specifically interested 
in partial search models, where the focus is on the behavior of the unemployed 
individuals looking for better jobs rather than the firms’ behavior in the labor market. 
We develop a basic out-of-the job search model that focuses on how optimal time and 
opportunity cost differ among low-income and high-income individuals, ceteris 
paribus, that is, given they have the same initial tastes, talents, and ability rents. Low-
income searchers who have low or no accumulated wealth to devote to job-seeking 
cannot afford to remain unemployed for a long time and tend to lower their 
reservation wages below what corresponds to their skills. In contrast, more wealthy 
seekers have more free time and disposable income to engage in search for a better 
job. Given their higher probability to find a better job, the value of their choice is 
likely to be higher. 
 
Income inequalities have further implications for job searchers. Human capital 
theories study the opportunity cost of purchased inputs in human capital production. 
The basic model formulated on optimal human capital investment is Becker’s model 
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(1967). This model generates general description of how ability and family wealth 
interact to determine the distribution of lifetime earnings. The opportunity cost of 
human capital investment depends on family incomes because families should pay for 
the post-secondary schooling required to gain additional skills. In this sense, wealthy 
agents can finance their education on better terms and in general can invest more and 
boost future earnings. Becker defines this difference in financing opportunities as 
“unequal opportunity,” since poor agents face higher opportunity cost of funds even 
when they have the same personal abilities. Following Becker’s model, we assume 
that wealthy individuals are more educated since they face lower costs of financing 
and would invest more in developing their skills. As a result, they would have more 
specialized skills to perform highly-skilled professional labor. Further, we investigate 
how the opportunity cost of job search adds to the opportunity cost of human capital 
in defining wage differentials. Poor agents face higher opportunity cost of delay and 
tend to choose from a limited range of opportunities, while rich individuals can afford 
to reject multiple job opportunities that do not correspond with their skills. Therefore, 
wealthy individuals find better jobs (including higher wage, more benefits, and safer 
working conditions) than their lower-income counterparts. 
 
The analysis can further be extended to include implications for individual careers. 
Learning models in the theory of earnings distributions (Farber and Gibbons (1996), 
Jovanovic (1979)) state that without information about their relative talents for 
different types of jobs, workers cannot make choices that maximize earnings. Thus, 
workers gain from work experience in two ways: first, they are paid the current wage, 
and second, they receive information about their skills that can boost future earnings. 
Since low-income agents accept low-paid jobs which require low-skilled labor, these 
agents would tend to gain less valuable experience at the workplace. This would 
decrease the quality of their sorting process and ultimately would lower their lifetime 
earnings. On the other hand, high-income agents would be employed in highly-skilled 
positions and work experience would improve their opportunities of finding even 
better jobs. We do not elaborate further on theories of learning, sorting and matching 
but concentrate on how the different opportunity costs of search for different income 
groups lead to “unequal opportunity” for the low-income searchers versus the high-
income searchers. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Part I is a discussion of the rationale for the paper 
and literature review. Part II represents a simple mathematical model of job search 
accounting for the number of years spent at a well-paid job. In Part III we modify this 
simple out-of-the-job search model introducing the total number of years to work. Part 
IV gives a job market equilibrium model, introducing initial income and the level of 
education as determinants of job search time. In the last Part V of the paper we turn to 
consumer theory and investigate the relationship between optimal job search time and 
the maximum utility of a worker who derives his satisfaction from two sources, 
consumption of goods and utilization of free, non-work time. The paper ends with 
conclusions. 
 
2. A Simple Out-of-the-job Search Model 
 
Our partial search model is focused on the behavior of the unemployed individuals 
looking for better jobs and not on firm behavior. One of our assumptions is that a 
better job is one that pays a wage rate beyond the minimal one 
o
w  because in the labor 
market higher wage is associated with higher labor productivity, i.e., the job is of 
greater value both for the individual and for the firm. We also assume that searching 
individuals are unemployed during the search. This constraint is set by the fact that 
low-skilled and low-income individuals have labor-intensive, exploitative jobs, which 
leaves them minimal leisure time to devote to job search. Ours is an out-of-the-job 
search model that excludes the possibility of on-the-job search. Furthermore, the 
worker decides on an optimal search policy, given that he knows the distribution of 
wages for his particular skills. We also assume constant value of money, i.e., 
inflationary effects and time value of money are ignored for the sake of simplicity. 
This assumption would not change the major implications of the mathematical results. 
The worker’s total gain from the job search can be expressed as: 
 
[ ]( ) ow t w y−  
 
where the worker is expected to work y  number of years at the well-paid job. The 
worker spends time t  searching for a well-paid job. The wage ( )w t  he would receive 
increases with search time, hence ( ) 0w t′ > . At the same time, the job search process is 
less productive with time and has diminishing returns, i.e., ( ) 0w t′′ < . Without search 
the worker would receive a lowest pay to the amount of minimum wage ow  but with 
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search there is a differential ( ) ow t w− . Thus, the net benefit from search to the 
unemployed individual will be of the form: 
 
[ ]( ) ( ) o ot w t w y w tpi = − −  
 
where from the total gain from search for a well-paid job we subtract the cost of 
searching ow t . This is what the worker sacrifices by not working for minimum wage 
during the search period. Maximizing net gain by the first-order condition, 
 
( ) ( ) 0ot w t y wpi ′ ′= − =  
owytw =′ )(  
 
Using the second-order condition, 
 
0)()( <′′=′′ ytwtpi  
 
proves a maximum for the net gain from search. The result of the optimization is that 
the worker will continue his job search until the marginal gain of the search equals his 
current wage ow  which represents his marginal cost of search. To find the effect of 
minimum wage on optimal search time we write the implicit function and apply the 
implicit-function rule: 
 
0)()(),,( =−′=′= oo wytwtywtF pi  
 
By the implicit-function rule, 
 
0)(
1*
<
′′
=−=
∂
∂
ytwF
F
w
t
t
w
o
o
 
 
There is a negative relationship between *t  and 
o
w , that is, the higher the initial 
minimum wage, the smaller the search time would be. In the context of unskilled and 
skilled, qualified labor the higher initial payment is connected with qualified labor. 
Thus, the result shows that highly skilled workers are likely to find better jobs sooner 
than those that hold less qualified jobs and receive low pay. Since firm demand for 
qualified labor is generally higher, these are the two effects of the higher demand – on 
the one hand, initial pay is higher and, on the other, it takes less time for professional 
labor to search for a job. This result adds up to the theory of wage differentials by 
which a major factor that contributes to wage differentials is the fact that the labor 
market consists of heterogeneous workers and firms. On the supply side of the market 
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the move from low-paid jobs to high-paid ones depends on various factors such as 
skill differentials, differentials resulting from efficiency wage payments, as well as 
non-wage job differentials (McConnell 1995). We find one more cause for wage 
differentials – the unequal opportunities for job search faced by skilled and unskilled 
workers. Given the cost of information and job search, some labor market segments 
are privileged in the process of finding better jobs, all other things equal, simply 
because they can afford the cost of search and have the time for it.  For the effect of 
the number of years to work y  on the optimal search time *t  we obtain: 
0)(
)(*
>
′′
′
−=−=
∂
∂
ytw
tw
F
F
y
t
t
y
 
The greater the number of years to be at an ideal, better-paid job, the longer one 
would search for this job. 
 
3. A Modified Job Search Model 
 
We then modify the model by specifying y  to be the total number of years the worker 
is expected to work throughout his lifetime. Hence, the number of years that he is 
expected to work at his better-paid job is y t− . We again assume that the worker is 
not employed while searching for an ideal job that pays )(tw  and there are positive 
but diminishing returns to job search, i.e., 0)( >′ tw , and 0)( <′′ tw . Without search 
the worker would receive a lowest pay to the amount of ow . The net gain of search is: 
 
twtytwt o−−= ))(()(pi  
 
We find the optimal search time by maximizing the obtained function: 
 
0)())(()( =−−−′=′ owtwtytwtpi  
0)()()( =−−′−′ owtwttwytw  
)(
)(
)(
)()(*
tw
wtw
y
tw
wtwytw
t oo
′
+
−=
′
−−
′
=  
 
By the second-order condition the net gain of job search is maximized: 
 
0)(2))(()()())(()( <′−−′′=′−′−−′′=′′ twtytwtwtwtytwtpi   
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We obtain that the optimal time to search for a job *t  is a discretionary part of the 
total working-age years. From analyzing this optimum we see that the faster the wage 
grows with search time, the longer the search goes. Thus when )(tw′  is infinitely 
large and the worker has the chance to infinitely increase his income by searching 
more, he will continue searching throughout his entire life or yt →* . However, if 
search time has little effect on the wage level, i.e., ( )w t′  tends to zero, the worker’s 
optimal search time would also tend to zero and the worker would not be likely to 
search at all. To find the effect of minimum wage on optimal search time we use the 
implicit-function rule where the implicit function is: 
 
0)())(()(),,( =−−−′=′= oo wtwtytwtywtF pi  
 
and by the implicit-function rule, 
0)(2))((
1*
<
′
−−
′′
=−=
∂
∂
twtytwF
F
w
t
t
w
o
o
 
 
This relationship again shows that the higher the initial minimum wage, the shorter 
the search would be. Thus, again the segment of low-skilled workers will incur higher 
job search costs as they will need more time for job search. Their opportunities for a 
better-paid job decrease. For jobs that have higher initial payment ow  search time *t  
is smaller. The more slowly the ideal wage grows with search, that is, the smaller 
)(tw′  is, the greater the effect of the initial wage is. For the effect of the total number 
of years to work y  on optimal search time we again obtain a positive value: 
0)(2))((
)(*
>
′
−−
′′
′
−=−=
∂
∂
twtytw
tw
F
F
y
t
t
y
 
 
Our simple job search model shows that the greater the total number of years to work, 
the longer the job search time. Thus, younger individuals will have more incentives to 
search than elderly people, as simple logic dictates. 
 
4. A Job Market Equilibrium Model 
 
To study the effect of initial endowment and education on wage rate we formulate a 
job market equilibrium model that accounts both for demand and supply on the labor 
market. We assume that the market is in equilibrium, i.e., worker supply of labor is 
equal to firm demand for it. We also assume demand for labor to be exogenously 
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determined, since we study worker behavior on the market. Hence, our analysis is 
focused on the supply side of the labor market rather than the demand side and firm 
behavior. Furthermore, we presume that the supply of labor depends on the wage rate 
w, the time available to workers t and their initial income 
o
m , such that: 
 
oo DmtwS =),,(  
 
The supply of labor is positively related to the wage level since a higher wage would 
stimulate people to supply more labor, hence, 0>wS . Another assumption is that the 
substitution effect prevails, i.e., the worker would likely substitute his leisure with 
work when he is stimulated by a higher wage. This assumption stems from the fact 
that for poor, low-paid individuals the substitution effect prevails over the income 
effect. Being highly paid and having substantial accumulated wealth, professionals in 
prestigious jobs are less likely to substitute their free time with work for more money. 
They are more prone to the income effect. Being less paid and with few savings, poor 
people are more expressly subject to the substitution effect. Thus, the greater the free 
time available to the individual, the greater his supply of labor and the longer the 
hours he would be willing to work, i.e., 0>tS  . At the same time, supply of labor is 
negatively related to the initial endowment or income  
o
m  that a worker has. Thus, a 
richer individual would be less likely to work and would have more leisure time. As 
opposed to him, a poorer person would be willing to supply more of his labor, 
therefore, 0<mS . Furthermore, the wage rate depends on the minimum wage rate ow , 
the educational level oe , and the total free time available to workers t . The function 
for the wage rate will be of the form: 
 
( , )
o o
w w g e t= +  
 
A higher educational level would affect the wage rate positively, as more educated 
individuals will be employed in highly paid professional jobs, i.e., 0>eg . If the 
worker has a lot of leisure time ,t  then he is able to search longer for a better paid job 
and wage rate is positively related to the free time which in this case becomes job-
search time and, therefore, 0>tg . Thus, we can formulate the model as: 
 
0),,( =− oo DmtwS   0>wS  0>tS   0<mS  
0),( =−− tegww oo   0>eg   0>tg  
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Assuming the derivatives to be continuous, we can use the implicit-function theorem 
where the wage rate w  and time t  are endogenous. The other variables are assumed 
to be exogenous. Solving by the implicit-function theorem, we analyze the effect of 
initial wealth or non-labor income om , as follows: 





−
=












∂
∂
∂
∂






− 01
m
o
o
t
tw S
m
t
m
w
g
SS
, 
where the Jacobian is nonzero: 
0<−−= ttw SgSJ  
 
The effect of the initial endowment on wage rate will be: 
0
0
>
+
−=
−
−
=
∂
∂
ttw
tmt
tm
o SgS
gS
J
g
SS
m
w
 
 
The relationship is positive which means that the higher the initial income of an 
individual, the greater his prospects of obtaining a better paid job. This result stresses 
the role of heterogeneous endowments on wage differentials, which has widely been 
discussed in classical economic literature. The positive relationship between initial 
endowments and wage rates can be analyzed one step further if we consider that the 
initial wealth in the form of accumulated capital can be readily available for human 
capital investment in training and education. Education and training deserve special 
attention here because they are major determinants of personal productivity. Having 
in mind that the opportunity cost of human capital investment depends on the initial 
income of individuals (usually in the form of family wealth), rich individuals can 
finance their schooling and training on better terms and in general can invest more 
and boost future earnings. On the other hand, poor individuals face higher opportunity 
cost of funds even when they have the same personal abilities and talents. This 
inequality of opportunity among poor and rich individuals translates into 
corresponding wage differentials no matter that their initial ability rents and 
productive capacities are equal. Our equilibrium labor market model implies that rich 
people, having an initial endowment or accumulated wealth, have more leisure time 
and hence more time for search: 
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The higher the initial income, the greater the free time is. Thus, rich individuals have 
more time to search for a better job. To trace the effects of the educational level on 
wage rate and search time we solve: 




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As expected, the relationship between educational level and wage rate is positive, 
which confirms our expectation that a higher educational level promises a higher 
wage. Thus, rich people with good prospects of getting better education actually have 
the opportunity to occupy well-paid jobs.  
0
1
0
<
+
−==
∂
∂
ttw
ewe
w
o SgS
gS
J
g
S
e
t
 
 
This derivation shows that more educated people need less time to search for a better 
job and are less likely to experience long periods of unemployment. At the same time, 
the search time for the less educated and less qualified workers increases and they are 
less likely to be employed at well-paid jobs. For the effect of minimum wage we solve 
analogously:  






=












∂
∂
∂
∂






− 1
0
1
o
o
t
tw
w
t
w
w
g
SS
   0<−−= ttw SgSJ  
0
1
0
>
+
=
−
=
∂
∂
ttw
tt
t
o SgS
S
J
g
S
w
w
 
 
                                                                                                                            - 13 - 
As can be expected, the higher the initial wage, the greater the prospects of the 
individual to find a better-paid job. Poor people who start at a very low wage level 
have less chance of getting a higher salary later. This result has implications about the 
growing inequality of opportunity as different groups of workers advance in their 
careers. Put in a specific context, if one is employed as a janitor, he would always be 
perceived as a janitor and would rarely be able to jump up the professional ladder into 
a better paid and more prestigious job. It is as if the very perception of the job a 
person is taking and the wage rate he accepts determine his future career and income. 
By the same token, a secretary may be quite knowledgeable about her boss’s business, 
be able to perform multiple, complex tasks, speak a number of languages and be 
computer literate. Yet, a secretary is often perceived as “the girl who makes the 
coffee” or as “the typist” at best and is likely to remain a low-paid staff member. With 
regard to the time devoted to search we find: 
0
11
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<
+
−==
∂
∂
ttw
w
w
o SgS
S
J
S
w
t
 
 
The effect of the minimum wage on the search time is negative, i.e., the higher the 
initial wage, the less the time dedicated to search. Thus, high-skilled workers are 
likely to find qualified job openings sooner than low-skilled workers find 
corresponding low-paid jobs. The effects of the firms’ labor demand on the wage rate 
and search time are analyzed as follows: 

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Solving for the two effects, 
0
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The effect of demand for labor on the wage rate is positive, which means that, as 
firms demand more labor, the market wage is likely to increase. The effect of labor 
demand on search time is: 
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As expected, the greater the firms’ demand for labor, the lower the search time for 
workers and the shorter spans of unemployment they would experience. 
 
Low-skilled jobs are characterized by long hours of tedious repetitive activities and 
are low-paid, as they do not require professional skills. These jobs are occupied by 
poor individuals who rely on subsistence level wages to live on. On the effort side, 
these individuals are time-constrained because they have to dedicate much more of 
their time working. On the income side, they are also limited – since they earn lower 
incomes, their opportunity costs of search are higher. Since the opportunity cost of 
unemployment is higher for these individuals, it is legitimate to assume that they 
would exert more work-efforts in order to remain employed. We consider pay-for-
performance wage rate and efficiency wage theories, which incorporate the possibility 
that wage increases may stimulate productivity and work effort. The classical models 
of efficiency wage theories are widely developed in the 1980s and 1990s and derive a 
series of implications on shirking issues, labor turnover, non-clearing labor markets 
and unemployment (Akerlof (1986), Katz (1986), Stiglitz (1987), (Weiss 1991)). The 
literature defines efficiency wage as the wage “which minimizes an employer’s wage 
cost per effective unit of labor service employed” (McConnell 1995). We demonstrate 
this wage-productivity dependency graphically in Figure 1 where at the optimum 
firms determine efficiency wage based on work effort: 
 
Figure 1 
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The work effort-wage curve is higher for the unskilled labor, as drawn in Figure 1.  
Thus, at the optimum, firms end up paying less skilled workers a lower wage uw  , 
whereas the wage received by high-skilled workers is sw . At the same time the effort 
for the less skilled workers is higher – they are supposed to work harder at the 
workplace and shirking is prevented by supervisors. Amidst the current world 
economic crisis, it is interesting to analyze this work effort-wage relationship from the 
perspective of an economic recession. 
 
Figure 2 
 
In a recession highly skilled workers are less likely to be freed. Even if individuals 
need to switch occupations, the cost of re-training will be covered by employers or 
will be recovered fully by the potential future wage. There would rarely be any 
change to their effort-wage curve so their work effort would likely remain the same. 
So would the optimal wage firms pay to them. The low-skilled workers will be much 
more exposed to unemployment since the supply of unskilled labor will remain 
relatively high in times of a crisis, yet, unemployed workers would not be able to find 
jobs in more professional areas as skill training will be extremely costly and time-
consuming for them. Since the opportunity cost of losing a job is higher for less 
skilled workers, they would increase their amount of effort in order to keep their jobs. 
This effect would result in an upward shift of the effort-wage curve, as depicted by 
Figure 2. Although low-skilled workers would on average exert more effort in times 
of a recession, their optimum wage is likely to decrease. Thus, poorer individuals will 
be required to work even more to earn sustainable wages and their search time for 
better jobs will be limited even more. Their cost of search would also increase. Thus, 
even the small pay obtained would be important for them and they would not opt to 
remain unemployed in order to search for a better job. 
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5. Worker Utility, Leisure and Working Time 
 
Job search can as well be analyzed from the perspective of consumer theory where the 
worker is a consumer of leisure and other commodities. We investigate the 
relationship between wage income and consumer behavior, i.e., what the optimum 
labor time and non-labor time that maximizes consumer utility is. Since we adopt an 
out-of-the-job search model for low-income workers, it is legitimate to say that the 
search time for a better job will be part of the leisure or non-work time an individual 
has. Here we use the terms “non-labor time,” “leisure,” “non-work time” and “job 
search time” interchangeably. Respectively, the “consumer” is a synonym for worker, 
as the latter can choose between work and leisure. We solve a standard Stone-Geary 
utility problem, where the consumer derives his utility from a bundle of goods, 
consumption C  and non-work time T L− , where T  is total time available to the 
worker, and L  is his working time in labor hours: 
 
βα )( LTCU −= ,          0, >βα  
 
Consumption must equal the worker’s income less his positive subsistence level of 
consumption oC . His income consists of non-labor income (accumulated wealth or 
some initial endowment) m  and labor income Lw  where w  is the pay per labor hour 
and L  is the number of labor hours worked. Thus, consumption can be expressed as: 
 
oCmwLLC −+=)(  
 
Job search time will depend on the non-work time a worker has, i.e., there is a 
positive relationship between non-work time  LT −  and search time *t . To find the 
optimal amount of labor and non-labor hours that maximize utility to the worker and 
the effect of wage rate on the optimal labor hours, we solve the optimization problem: 
 
Maximize  βα )()( LTCCU o −−=  
 
where the worker’s consumption must equal his income, or:  
 
oCmwLLC −+=)(  [1] 
 
Substituting expression [1] in the utility function gives an unconstrained objective 
function: 
  
Maximize βα )()()( LTCmwLLU o −−+=  
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Differentiating with respect to labor and setting this derivative equal to zero, 
 
0)()()()( 11 =−−+−−−+= −− βαβα βα LTCmwLLTCmwLwU ooL  
 
11 )()()()( −− −−+=−−+ βαβα βα LTCmwLLTCmwLw oo  
)()( oCmwLLTw −+=− βα  
)( oCmwLwLwT −+=− ββαα  
 
Thus, the optimum number of labor hours to the worker can be expressed as: 
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When non-labor income m  is exactly equal to basic consumption oC , labor is a share 
of total worker time measured by the coefficient βαα + . There is a negative 
relationship between the amount of labor hours worked and the amount of non-labor 
income, i.e., the higher the non-labor income a worker has, the lower the amount of 
labor he will perform to attain his optimal level of consumption. Adversely, labor is 
positively affected by a larger amount of subsistence consumption. Therefore, the 
worker has to work more hours to meet his basic needs. Alternatively, the amount of 
non-work time that maximizes worker utility can be expressed as: 
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This expression shows a positive relationship between non-labor (search) time and 
wage rate as well as between search time and non-labor income. Hence, highly paid 
workers face lower opportunity cost of searching for a new job. In addition, 
individuals that have more initial accumulated wealth will tend to enjoy more free 
time and will have more time to search for a new better job. To see the exact effect of 
wage rate on optimal amount of labor hours we differentiate: 
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The derivative shows a positive effect of wage on the amount of labor when non-labor 
income exceeds basic consumption. In other words, when oCm > , the worker has 
some excess income so he needs to work less and would be willing to substitute labor 
with leisure. However, if subsistence consumption exceeds non-labor income, i.e., 
oCm < , the income effect prevails and the worker needs to work more to reach his 
subsistence level. The sign of this derivative is indicative of the shape of the labor 
supply curve. When non-labor income exceeds minimum consumption the derivative 
is positive, which determines a positively sloped labor supply curve, that is, labor 
increases with the wage level. This would be the case with a strong substitution effect 
when the consumer (worker) substitutes his free time with labor due to the wage 
incentive. Adversely, the supply curve is negatively sloped, if oCm <  or the increase 
in the wage reduces the amount of labor. This would be the effect with a backward-
bending labor supply curve when the income effect prevails over the substitution 
effect. The Stone-Geary utility optimization problem can have further implications if 
we introduce a budget constraint for the worker such that: 
 
mwLLTpCp TC +=−+ )( , 
 where Cp  is the price of consumption, Tp  is the price of non-labor time, wL  is wage 
income and m  is nonwage income. The worker will have a logarithmic utility 
function of the form: 
 
)ln()1()ln( LTCCU o −−+−= αα , 
 
where C  is the worker’s consumption, oC  is a minimum level of consumption, T  is 
total time and L  is his working time with 10 << α . Thus, LT −  is the worker’s non-
labor time, which he uses to search for a better job. To find the optimum number of 
labor hours, we solve the following constrained optimization problem: 
 
Maximize )ln()1()ln( LTCCU o −−+−= αα  
 
Subject to mwLLTpCp TC +=−+ )(  
Introducing a Lagrange multiplier, 
[ ])()ln()1()ln( LTpCpmwLLTCCZ TCo −−−++−−+−= λαα , 
and setting the three first-order derivatives equal to zero, 
0)( =−−−+= LTpCpmwLZ TCλ  
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From the last two equations [3] and [4] we derive: 
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From the budget constraint we have: 
 
)( LTpmwLCp TC −−+=  
 
Substituting back in [5]: 
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As expected, the optimal number of labor hours depends negatively on the wage rate 
and non-labor income and positively on the price of free time, which is proportionate 
to the opportunity cost of working. Thus, poor agents whose labor income should 
satisfy the subsistence level of consumption, will face higher price of free time and 
would work more labor hours to attain their optimum utility level of consumption. We 
then analyze the effects that wage rate, non-labor income and the price of free time 
have on the amount of free time, as well as on job search time: 
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Free time depends positively on income from labor and non-labor sources, once basic 
consumption oC  is satisfied. The opportunity cost of leisure is the total amount of 
wage lost and the price to be paid for leisure, or Tpw + . Since the individual searches 
for a job while not working, search time will be a fraction of non-work time. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Some jobs are more dangerous and onerous than others, some offer more earning 
stability than others, some offer more perks in addition to the wage rate. All these 
differences result in inequalities and wage differentials. Our results show one more 
cause for wage differentials – the unequal opportunities for better jobs that low-skilled 
and high-skilled workers face. Taking into account the costs of information and job 
search, we find that some segments of the labor market are privileged in the job 
search process, ceteris paribus, simply because they can afford the time to search for 
these opportunities. We conclude that initial endowments cause differences in the 
opportunity cost of job search and result in wage differentials - the higher the initial 
income of an individual, the greater his prospects to obtain a better paid job. There is 
a negative relationship between optimal search time for a better job and the potential 
minimum wage on that job, i.e., the higher the initial minimum wage, the smaller the 
search time would be. 
 
Wealthy individuals, having higher initial endowment or accumulated wealth, have 
more leisure time and hence more time for search which increases the value-added of 
their optimization problem. Wealthy individuals face lower opportunity cost of 
investment in education and professional training. On average, wealthy individuals 
are more educated and thus qualified for higher-paid jobs. More educated people need 
less time to search for a better job and are less likely to experience long periods of 
unemployment. Low-income individuals who start at low-paid jobs have smaller 
chance of getting high-paid jobs later. This result has implications about the growing 
inequality of opportunity as different groups of workers advance in their careers. At 
the time of a recession low-income individuals are more prone to unemployment and 
their search costs will increase relative to those of wealthy individuals. 
                                                                                                                            - 21 - 
References: 
 
1. Akerlof, George A., and Janet L. Yellen. “Efficiency Wage Models of the 
Labor Market”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
2. Alchian A.A. and W.R. Allen, University Economics. Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1964 
3. Becker, Gray S. “Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income”, 
W.S. Woytinsky Lecture, No 1. University of Michigan, 1967 
4. Burdett, K. “A Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates”. The 
American Economic Review, Vol 68, No 1, Mar 1978, pp212-220 
5. Ehrenreich, Barbara, “Nickle and Dime: On (Not) Getting By in America,” 
Metropolitan Books, May 2001 
6. Faber, Henry S. and Robert Gibbons. “Learning and Wage Dynamics”. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics/ pp 1007-1048, 1996 
7. Jovanovic, B. “Matching, Turnover, and Unemployment”. Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol 92, pp108-122, 1979 
8. Kahn, Lawrence M. “The Returns to Job Search: A Test of Two Models” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), pp. 496-503 
9. Katz, Lawrence F. “Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation”. NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 1986. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1986. p. 
235-276 
10. McCall J.J. “Economics of Information and Job Search”. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics., Vol 84, No 1 , Feb 1970, pp113-126 
11. McConnell, Campbell R. Stanley L. Brue. Contemporary Labor economics, 
McGraw-Hill, 1995.p225-235 
12. Mortensen, D.T. “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions”. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol.30, No 4 , Jul 1997,pp 505-517 
13. Pissarides, C.A., “Search Unemployment with On-the-Job Search”. The 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol 61, 1994, pp 457-475  
14. Smith, Gerald E., Meera Venkatraman, Ruby Roy Dholakia, “Diagnosing the 
search cost effect: Waiting time and the moderating impact of prior category 
knowledge”. Journal of Economic Psychology 20, 1999.  pp.285 – 314 
15. Stigler, G.J. “The Economics of Information”. Journal of Political Economy. , 
Vol69,June 1961. pp 213-225 
                                                                                                                            - 22 - 
16. Stigler, G.J. “Information in the Labor Market” Journal of Political Economy. 
Vol. 70, No5, Part 2, Oct 1962, pp 94-104  
17. Stiglitz, Joseph. “The Causes and Consequences of the Dependency of Quality 
on Price”. Journal of economic Literature. March 1987, p. 1-48 
18. Van Den Berg, J.G  “Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory”. The Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 255-277 
19. Van den Berg, G.J. “A Structural Dynamic Analysis of Job Turnover and the 
Costs associated with Moving to Another Job”. The Economic Journal Vol 
102, Sep 1992, pp 1116-1133. 
20. Wallraff, Günter. “Ganz Unten,” Kiepenheuer & Witsch; Auflage: Auflage 
unbekannt, 1985 
21. Weiss, Andrew. “Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and 
Wage Dispersion.” Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1991. 
22. Yoon, Bong Joon. “A Model of Unemployment Duration with Variable Search 
Intensity”. The Review of Economics and Statistics., Vol. 63, No. 4 Nov., 
1981, pp. 599-609 
